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the United States Supreme Court would have arrived at a 
similar conclusion if it had had this particular problem be-
fore it in the Urie case. 
In view of my conclusion that it should be held that the 
statute of limitations did not commence to run until the 
manifestation of substantial harm in 1953, it is unnecessary 
to consider whether, in any event, defendant employer should 
be held to have waived the running of the statute of limitations 
for the period during which plaintiff continued to work at 
the same employment with defendant's consent and continued 
to receive treatment from defendant's medical facilities for 
an affliction which appeared to be of a relatively minor and 
temporary nature. 
For the reasons stated, I concur in the reversal of the 
judgment. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent, for the reasons expressed by Mr. 
Justice Warne in the opinion prepared by him for the District 
Court of Appeal, (Cal.App.) 311 P.2d 40. 
[Sac. No. 6826. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1958.J 
GRACE MARIE VATER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF 
GJ_.~I~NN et al., Defendants; GLENN-COLUSA IRlU-
GATION DISTRICT, Respondent. 
[1] State of California-Tort Liability.-Generally, in the absence 
of a statutory or constitutional provision to the contrary, the 
state and its agencies are immune from liability for tort in the 
discharge of governmental duties and activities. 
[2] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Liability in Tort.-The general 
rule of immunity of the state and its agencies from liability for 
tort in the discharge of governmental duties and activities is 
applicable to irrigation districts. 
[3] Id. -Irrigation Districts- Liability in Tort.- Wat. Code, 
§§ 22730, 22731, relating to public liability of irrigation dis-
tricts, show a legislative intent not to abrogate the rule of 
governmental immunity from tort liability for irrigation dis-
[1] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
States, Territories and Dependencies, §§ 73, 75 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 644; Am.Jur,. Irrigation, § 85. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] State of California,§ 57; [2, 3] 
Waters, § 549; [ 6] Nuisances, § 49; Waters, § 549. 
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loss caused tortious conduct of the government rest on the 
injured individual it among all mem-
bers of the matter, and 
where the its intention to 
maintain that intention is uv<tH<JlHll!L. 
[5] !d.-Tort Liability.-To state a cause of action based on the 
theory that an to the doctrine of immunity from 
liability for tort where a unit is main-
taining a nuisance, must show that a legislative body 
has declared the of to be a nuisance. 
[6] Nuisances-Pleading: Waters-Irrigation Districts-Liability 
in Tort.-A in a death action alleging that 
certain persons, some of whom were agents of defendant 
irrigation district, constructed a private roadway over their 
land in extension of a county road so as to make the private 
roadway appear to be of the county road, that the dis-
trict or its predecessor in interest constructed a wooden 
bridge to connect two portions of the private roadway which 
were separated by the district's main canal, that there was a 
45-degree turn where the roadway met the bridge but the 
turn was not indicated by any signs or warning devices, that 
the levees of the canal were above the roadway and travelers 
could not observe the abrupt change of direction or see the 
bridge until they were upon it, and that the roadway and 
bridge (which was later taken over by defendant county) thus 
constituted a dangerous and defective condition and an "abso-
lute nuisance per se," did not state facts sufficient to constitute 
a nuisance; the situation therein described was not injurious 
to health within the meaning of Civ. Code, § 3479, there was 
no specific allegation that the accident, which occurred when 
plaintiff's husband drove his car off the bridge into the canal, 
took place on a public highway, and the claimed defective 
condition did not unlawfully obstruct the free use of the road, 
even if viewed as a public one. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Glenn 
County and from an order denying motion to vacate the judg-
ment. W. T. Belieu and Curtiss E. Wetter,• Judges. Af-
firmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment for 
defendants affirmed. 
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Geis & Byrd and Carroll F. 
C. J.-Plaintiff this action Glenn 
County and the Glenn-Colusa District damages 
for the death of her and son. General 
and special demurrers by the district to the second amended 
complaint were sustained without leave to amend, and judg-
ment was entered in its favor. 1 Plaintiff moved to set aside 
the judgment upon the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise and excusable neglect. She filed a supporting affi-
davit of her attorney to the effect that on the hearing of the 
demurrer he had neglected to argue an available theory of 
liability. The motion was denied without prejudice to its 
renewal within 10 days, accompanied by a proposed amended 
complaint. Pursuant to this permission plaintiff renewed the 
motion and presented a proposed third amended complaint. 
This motion was also denied. 
The principal question is whether plaintiff has alleged facts 
which constitute a cause of action. 
The allegations of the second amended complaint may be 
summarized as follows: In 1910 certain persons, some of 
whom were agents of the district, constructed a private road-
way over their land in extension of County Road R so as to 
make the private appear to be part of the county 
road. About the same time the district or its predecessor in 
interest constructed a wooden bridge to connect two portions 
of the private roadway which were separated by the district's 
main canal. There was a 45-degree turn where the roadway 
met the bridge, but the turn was not indicated by any signs 
or warning devices, and there were no adequate barricades, 
railings or lights. The levees of the canal were above the road-
way, and, because of the construction and height of the levees 
and the bridge, travelers could not observe the abrupt change 
of direction or see the bridge until they were upon it. As a 
result, travelers were likely to drive off the bridge into the 
canal, and the roadway and bridge thus constituted a dan-
gerous and defective condition and an ''absolute nuisance 
per se." The district this condition to exist on 




over by the to be ma:Int;anled 
Although the and its ,,,,.,.,";"'"''"' 
failed to """"""rliv 
husband was led the am:JPa.ra!'lP.e 
rn•'r~"'"" to believe that it 
mate result of the da11gerou 
the he drove his car 
he and his son were killed. 
The third amended in sub-
"'"'"'"""'" of the second amended complaint and 
further stated that there is a between the several 
parties as to whether the or the district or both are 
responsible for the maintenance the bridge and that plain-
tiff does not know whether either or both are responsible. It 
was also alleged that does not know whether the dis-
trict constructed the bridge or acquired it, that the dangerous 
condition has existed for 40 years and that the district had 
notice of it. 
[1] The general rule is in the absence of a statutory 
or constitutional provision to contrary, the state and its 
agencies are immune from for tort in the discharge 
of governmental duties and activities. (Pianka v. State, 
46 Cal.2d 208, 210 P.2d 458]; Talley v. Northern San 
Diego County 41 Cal.2d 33, 36 [257 P.2d 22]; 
Stang v. City of Mill 38 Cal.2d 486, 488 [240 P.2d 
980].) [2] This rule has been applied to irrigation districts. 
(Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 545 [269 P. 171]; 
Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Byron-Bethany Irr. Dist., 136 Cal. 
App. 375, 380 et seq. [29 P.2d 217, 30 P.2d 516]; Whiteman 
v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 60 Cal.App. 234, 241-242 
[212 P. 706]; see Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hos-
pital Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 40 [257 P.2d 22].) 
Plaintiff does not claim that the district was acting in a 
proprietary capacity with respect to the bridge and roadway, 
and the only provisions upon which she relies as constituting 
a waiver of the district's immunity are sections 22725-22732 
of the Water which constitute the article entitled "Pub-
lic !Jiability" in the division of the code relating to irrigation 
districts. div. 5, ch. 4, art. 4.) These 
sections are of no avail to 
[3] Section 22731 reads : in the preceding por-
tion of this article shall be construed as creating any liability 
except as provided in Section 22730 unless it would have 
Irr. 
considered the "~'v"c"'u 
tion district law 
pealed when the Water 




the only new Cal.2d at p. 
127.) The Powers Farms case was an action for damage to 
land caused the seepage of water from a canal of an irriga-
tion district, and it was under the of article 
I, section of the California Constitution which prohibits 
damage to property for use without compensation. 
We held that this provision gave the a cause of action 
against the district, but that the part of section 23 of the 
irrigation district liability law which the of a 
claim in actions based upon the or defective con-
dition of property of the district was to the action, 
and that plaintiff's failure to file a claim prevented his recov-
ery. It is clear that we did not consider section 2 of the act as 
imposing liability upon the district for defective conditions 
because we expressly stated that the basis of liability was the 
constitutional provision (19 CaL2d at p. 126) and that the 
act imposed no liability on the district other than the one to 
pay certain judgments its officers (19 Cal.2d at 
p. 127, quoted above). 
•section 22732, the only section in the article which follows section 
2273], permits the district to 
any liability. It is not alleged the carried insurance cover-
ing the liability claimed here, in which case it has sometimes been held 
that the :injured person could maintain an action. (Taylor v. Knox 
Cmmty Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767 [167 S.W.2d 700); Rogers v. 
Butler, 170 Tenn. 125 [92 S.W.2d 414].) 
"Now contained in section 22727 of the code which provides: "When-
ever it is claimed that any person or has been or dam-
aged as a result of any or condition any property 
under the control of any or lts officers or employees or the 
negligence of any officer or of a district, a verified claim for 
damages shall be presented in and filed with the officers or em-
ployees involved and also with within 90 days after the 
accident or injury has occurred. If an or employee cannot be 
found to be served, the o:fi1cer's or employee's copy may be served 
on the secretary, but in any event a verified claim must be served on 
the secretary. " 
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There is no doubt that section 4 of the act and section 
22731 of the code show a intent not to abrogate 
the rule of for districts 
except with respect to the of such judgments. In 
the present case no has been obtained or sought 
against any officer of liability can-
not be based upon the of the Water Code. 
[4] Most of the authorities who have written 
on the subject strongly advocate abolition or modification of 
the principle of which lets the loss 
caused by tortious conduct of the government rest on the in-
jured individual instead of it among all the 
members of the the beneficiaries of the govern-
mental activity. (See, e. g., 2 Harper and James, The Law 
of Torts (1956), 1612; Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), 775; 
Borchard, State and jjfunicipal Liability in Tort-Proposed 
Statutory Reform, 20 .A.B..A.J. 747 et seq.; Kuchel, Should 
California Accept Tort Liability? 25 Cal. State Bar J. 146, 
151.) However, the or restriction of this doc-
trine is primarily a matter (see Talley v. North-
ern San Diego County Hospital 41 Cal.2d 33, 41 [257 
P.2d 22]; Waterman v. Los Angeles County General Hos-
pital, 123 Cal..App.2d 143, 144 [266 P.2d 221]), and, where, 
as here, the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to 
maintain immunity, that intention is controlling. 
[5] Several cases have recognized an exception to the im-
munity doctrine where a governmental unit is maintaining a 
nuisance. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 106-
107 [162 P.2d 625] ; Hassell v. City & Omtnty of San Fran-
cisco, 11 Cal.2d 168, 170 [78 P.2d 1021]; Adams v. City of 
Modesto, 131' Cal. 501, 502-503 [63 P. 1083] ; Peterson v. City 
of Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387 [51 P. 557] ; Lind v. City of San 
Luis Obispo, 109 Cal. 340, 343 [ 42 P. 437] ; Bloom v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 503 [3 P. 129] .) In consid-
ering whether the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute a 
nuisance, we must keep in mind that, in order to state a cause 
of action based upon this theory, the must show that 
a legislative body has declared the condition complained of 
to be a nuisance. (Palmquist v. Met·cer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 101 
[272 P.2d 26]; Ward v. Oakley Go., 125 Cal..App.2d 840, 850-
851 [271 P.2d 536] ; Brooks v. O#y of Monterey, 106 Cal..App. 
649, '654 [290 P. 540] ; cf. People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 879 
et seq. [118 P.2d 472]; People v. Johnson, 129 Cal.App.2d 
1, 8-9 [277 P.2d 45] .) 
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(6] Plaintiff contends that this case comes within section 
3479 of the Civil in part: "Anything 
which is . or unlawfully obstructs the 
manner, of . . . any 
a nuisance." The situation 
was not to health within 
u>ca.u"'""E; of this section. There is no allegation 
that the accident took on a highway, and, even 
if we were to assume that this deficiency is cured by the 
allegations that the was a bridge and that 
plaintiff's husband believed the road to be a public highway, 
the claimed defective condition did not unlawfully obstruct 
the free use of the road in the customary manner. Our atten-
tion has been called to no other statute which would support 
a conclusion that the facts constitute a nuisance. 
Plaintiff claims that the trial court failed to recognize the 
nuisance exception to the doctrine and that she 
should be given another opportunity to amend her complaint. 
She has made no contention, however, that her allegations 
which describe the condition of the bridge and roadway are 
untrue or incomplete, and it does not appear that there is 
any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by 
amendment. Under the circumstances, there was no abuse of 
discretion in failing to grant further leave to amend. (Of. 
Lemoge E~ectric v. County of San Mateo, 46 Cal.2d 659, 664 
[297 P.2d 638].) 
The order sustaining the demurrer to the second amended 
complaint is not appealable, and the attempted appeal there-
from is dismissed. The judgment and the order denying the 
motion to vacate the are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Once again this court is faced with the question of the 
scope of and again the majority has 
seen fit to broaden the scope when an analysis of applicable 
statutes shows such action to be clearly unwarranted. 
The majority in this case determines that the irrigation 
district the is immune from suit under 
the doctrine of immunity on the grounds that 
there is no statutory basis for liability, and that the condition 
complained of was not a nuisance within the meaning of Civil 
Code ( 




is not without au-
there is no basis for 
incorrect and the result 
article of the Water 
section 22727 and 
Inc. v. Oonsolidat-
.) 
that '' \Vhenever 
nl"nn.Pl"t.v has been injured 
uain<logeu as a result of or defective condition 
nl'."n'""tv under the control of any district or its officers 
or or the of any officer or employee of 
a a verified claim for shall be presented in 
writing and filed with the officers or employees involved and 
also with the of the district within 90 after the 
accident or has occurred. If an officer or employee 
cannot be found to be the officer's or employee's copy 
may be served on the but in any event a verified 
claim must be served on the " (Emphasis added.) 
The progenitor of this section is found in Deering General 
Laws (Stats. p. and was entitled the Irrigation 
District Law. With the exception of the words 
''and/ or'' which were inserted as follows : '' \Vher ,·er . . . 
as a result of any ... condition of any property under the 
control of any district or its officers or employ'2es and/or the 
~'"''""''"''LL'-''-' of any officer . . . " the two sections are identical. 
To be more the Public article has merely in-
corporated the sections of the District Liability 
Law and these sections different designations: sections 
1 and 2 of the Law became sections 22725, 22726, 
and 22732 of the Water section 2 was further trans-
posed into sections 22727 and 22729, and sections 3 and 4 
became sections 22730 and 22731. 
The District Law was construed in 
Powers Inc. v. OonsoUdated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 123 
[119 P.2d 717]. In that case brought an action 
lT'vw·~.t"''n district for sustained as a result 
The action was based upon 
of the California Constitution requiring 
for or taken for a 
the principle that failure 
of section 2 
§ 22727) was fatal to a 
Mar. 823 
before the 
re<{UJtreme:nt:s, could maintain an action based 
upon the constitutional This court held that he 
could not. The court reasoned that the act evinced a 
intent to embrace all actions Inc. v. Con-
solidated Irr. supra, 129 , 
and that failure to with the 
ed a cause of action 
In its conclusion the court sections 
of the Irrigation Law at 
there any indication to forsake the 
enabled injured parties to sue the its 
officers or employees. To the ""'nt.>'5l1'v 
to point out that section 2 
against a district on of " ( 1) a 
condition of property of the district and 
officer Or employee or (2) a dangerous Or £11'1·1'~11'1 
of property of the district, that a general 
reference to negligence, or (3) the 
employee." (Emphasis added.) (Powers Inc. v. Con-
solidated hr. Dist., supra, 128.) This statement is 
only of the interpretation that an district's govern-
mental immunity is removed by this statute and that such 
districts are liable of their or officers. 
Therefore, it vcrould seem to follow that section 2 of 
the Irrigation Law and 22727 of the Water 
Code are the same, and under the former a district is liable 
apart from its for a and defective condi-
tion, the district still remains liable under section 
22727. 
However, we are now told that this is not so, but that by 
some peculiar alchemy the of the Irrigation 
District Liability Law into the Code altered the nature 
of these sections to such an that this court is now re-
quired to regard sections 22730 22731 of the Water Code 
as controlling. Thus, the district's would be limited 
to negligent acts of its officers in their official capacity. Fur-
thermore we are told that in the Powers case "It is clear that 
we did not consider section 2 of the act [now Wat. Code, 
§ 22727] as imposing upon the district for defective 
conditions because we stated that the basis of lia-
bility was the constitutional provision [citation] and that the 
824 GLENN [49 C.2d 
aet imposed no district other than the one 
to pay certain its officers [citation]." 
As an original the majority's construction of 
sections 22730 and 22731 have been plausible, but it is 
now forestalled by the Powers case. Moreover, if this court 
now seeks to the Powers case as not affecting the 
district's liability other than as described in sections 22730 
and 22731, it will be necessary to the contrary lan-
guage therein since a of that case makes it obvious 
such was not the interpretation when it was written. 
To substantiate this latter statement one need only read 
this court's restatement of plaintiff's contention in the Powers 
case, which appears as follows: "The respondent .•. con-
tends that the law [Irrigation District Liability LawJ con-
cerns actions sounding in tort; that it has no reference to the 
general liability of the district, and should be construed as 
applying only to suits against directors, officers, agents, and 
employees, based on negligence, and to the secondary lia-
bility of the district, created by section 3 [now Wat. Code, 
§ 22730], to pay certain judgments against officers." (Em-
phasis added; 19 Cal.2d 123, 127-128.) This contention was 
rejected notwithstanding sections identical to sections 22730 
and 22731 of the Water Code. This court stated that the 
statute could only be construed in the manner contended 
by ignoring the reference in the title to the liability of the 
irrigation district and the phraseology of section 2 (now 
Wat. Code, § 22727). There can be no question from this 
language that this court, at the time of the Powers case, 
viewed the district as liable apart from its officers. 
The Powers case, then, established that the district's lia-
bility was twofold: (1) a general indepE'lHlent liability under 
section 2 of the liability law (now Wat. Code, § 22727) and 
(2) liability for the negligent act of its employees in their 
official capacity. The necessary implication of the decision 
being that sections 3 and 4 of the liability law (now Wat. 
Code, §§ 22730 and 22731) were only describing the conditions 
under which a district would be liable for the acts of its em-
ployees and were not the district's independent lia-
bility. Thus, without sections 3 and 4 a district would not be 
liable for the acts of its employees when discharging govern-
mental duties and activities since a statutory provision is 
necessary to remove the protection of governmental immunity 
(see Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 545 [269 P. 
171]; Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Byron-Bethany Irr. Dist., 
Mar.1958] VATER v. CouNTY oF GLENN 
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136 Cal.App. 375, 380 [29 P.2d 217, 30 P.2d 516]). Under 
sections 3 and 4 a district's liability for its employees follows 
only when a judgment is rendered against an employee who, 
acting in his official capacity, negligently injures another, 
and providing proper notice is given to the district (W at. 
Code, §§ 22727, 22730, 22731). However, if this is the extent 
of the district's liability it is obvious there is a large gap 
between the persons who may recover· against a district and 
those who are injured. The closing of this gap was achieved 
in the Powers case where this court construed the applicable 
sections as rendering the district liable under specified con-
ditions apart from its employees. The court did not blur 
their intent but made it manifest that sections 3 and 4 were 
not to be regarded as trespassing on an injured person's right 
to proceed directly against the district apart from its em-
ployees. (Powers Farms, Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 
1upra, 128.) 
Therefore, section 22727 affirmatively answers the major-
ity's question of whether there is a statute declaring the dis-
trict liable independently of its employees. Any doubt that 
this is its purpose or meaning is answered in Powers Farms, 
Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., supra. If there is some ques-
tion concerning the legislative intent as to this section, the 
members of the court may draw comfort from the fact that 
the Legislature has apparently acquiesed to the Powers case 
and its implications since they were well aware of it but 
made no changes when codifying the Water Code. 
Where plaintiff's complaint alleges compliance with the 
procedural prerequisites, as here, and sets forth proper 
grounds for a claim against the district, that is, a dangerous 
and defective condition is being maintained which caused an 
injury, this is all that is necessary to state a cause of action 
(see Knight v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764, 766 [160 
P.2d 779]; Insolo v. Imperialirr. Dist., 147 CaLApp.2d 172, 
175 [305 P.2d 176]). 
For the foregoing reasons the trial court erroneously sus-
tained defendant's general demurrer, and the judgment of 
dismissal which followed should be reversed. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 16, 
1958. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
